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ABSTRACT: This investigation highlights the safety of DP (Dynamic Positioning) systems by briefly 
discussing the existing risk assessment methods and risk control measures provided by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO). Following a study regarding DP systems and the loss of position inci-
dents reported to the International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) and contained in the World 
Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD), the relevant hazards are identified and collated. The primary 
causes of loss of position incidents were found to be: the positional reference system failures and thruster 
failures, with both contributing to 20.6% each of the total incidents from 2000 to 2016. Similarly the time 
period of the analysis is the 17 years between 2000 and 2016. Given the two stated primary causes, the 
positional reference system failures and thruster failures, the thruster failures are analysed further. This 
is due to thruster failures occurring at an increased rate within DP incidents from 2011 to 2016. Hence, 
this trend, between 2011 and 2016, is analysed further. Three undesired events for loss of position due 
to thruster failures were identified, these are as follows: “drive off”, “drift off” and “time loss”. Further 
investigation of incidents in more recent years, in this case, 2012 to 2016, identified that the DP control 
system accounted for 33.7% of the initiating incidents that led to thruster failures. Furthermore, the unde-
sired event “time loss” accounted for 71.2% of total incidents caused by thruster failures.
or equipment operating correctly in response to its 
inputs. In essence, this means the achievement of 
safety through application of control systems. This 
requires identifying what has to be done and how 
well it should be done” (Bell, 2010).
DP has evolved over the years, from use as a tool 
for mobile offshore drilling units, for maintaining 
position over offshore wells, to being employed 
for a wide range of position keeping operations. 
We see DP systems being fitted on an increasingly 
large number of new and diverse vessels, from off-
shore units to shuttle tankers to passenger vessels 
(IMO 1994).
The increase in the number of diverse applica-
tions results in an increase to the estimated risks 
involved with dynamic positioning vessels, further 
requiring an increased level of safety. To this end 
there has been a growth in the development of the 
dynamic positioning systems. There are now sev-
eral classes from DP0 to DP3 (DNV 2012), each 
class with a different level of safety.
The rationale behind this topic is to identify, inves-
tigate and analyse the loss of position incidents due 
to DP system failure. These incidents are analysed 
1 INTRODUCTION
Many marine vessels are now equipped with 
Dynamic Positioning (DP) systems. These ves-
sels have different functions and come in differ-
ent sizes. Some vessels are used for Simultaneous 
Operations (SIMOPS) and Combined Operations 
(COMOPS), bringing them in close proximity with 
other vessels and/or offshore installations. Some 
are used to conduct diving operations, with a huge 
number of vessels also used for drilling operations. 
The functions of these DP vessels are very numer-
ous, challenging and distinct. To cater for these 
functions, their level of safety was required to be 
increased and classified. Through time, with sup-
port from different organizational bodies and from 
lessons learnt from past DP failures, the safety of 
DP systems and vessels has been increased. These 
DP systems now utilize a redundancy scheme to 
ensure that a single failure would not lead to an 
accident. In this research the term safety is derived 
from the definition of functional safety outlined by 
Bell (2010). This states that “functional safety is a 
part of the overall safety that depends on a system 
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according to the seasons in which they occurred, 
types of vessels, main causes and initiating causes.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Dynamic positioning
DP can be defined as “a means of holding a ves-
sel in a relatively fixed position with respect to the 
ocean floor, without using anchors, accomplished 
by two or more propulsive devices, controlled by 
inputs from sonic instruments on the sea bottom 
and on the vessel, by gyrocompass, by satellite nav-
igation or by other means” (Holvik 1998).
The launch of the Global Positioning System 
Satellite network brought new ideas and new tech-
nology to be integrated into the DP vessels for 
more efficient performance. In 1981, the Nautical 
Institute began working on certification process 
for DP operators. This was done to reduce acci-
dents and failures caused by human error. In 1983, 
the Department of Energy and the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate produced guidelines for 
diving from DP vessels. Howard Shatto in 1983 
further improved on the DP systems, allowing 
greater water depths of 7,500 m and even rougher 
seas to be achievable. From his knowledge of sat-
ellite positioning and through his participation in 
the first use of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) for DP systems in 1983, the Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF) for DP systems was 
improved six-fold (DPC-MTS 1996).
By 1985, the number of DP capable vessels had 
increased to over 150. At this time, the vessel types 
equipped with DP systems had also increased. 
The following are some of the types of DP vessels 
that were available by 1985 based on their func-
tions: Drillships, Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
(MODU), Diving Semi-Submersibles, Diving and 
Emergency Response Vessels, Remote Operated 
Vessels, Diving Support Vessels, Shuttle Tankers 
and Accommodation Vessels (Flotels).
The following years saw an increase in the use of 
DP systems various functions and vessel types. In 
1990, the first DP Floating Production Storage and 
Offloading (FPSO) vessel, Seillean, was launched 
by British Petroleum. The Dynamic Positioning 
Vessel Owners Association (DPVOA) was formed 
in the same year. In 1994, IMO provided guidelines 
for DP systems, MSC/Circ.645, the same year, the 
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), introduced 
their first DP rules. The following year, 1995, the 
International Marine Contractors Association 
(IMCA) was formed through the merger of the 
Association of Offshore Diving Contractors and 
the DPVOA. In a bid to encourage exchange of 
information, foster improvement of DP reliability, 
develop guidelines, train and educate, and address 
any other issues pertinent to DP that encourage 
an incident free operation of DP systems. The DP 
committee was founded in 1996 as a Professional 
Committee of the Marine Technology Society 
(Sean 2009).
DP systems have been improved considerably 
since the installation of the first DP drill ship, 
Eureka. Vessels used for a variety functions are 
now equipped with DP systems. Some functions 
have been stated previously.
2.2 Classification of the DP systems
The different classes in the IMO and the ABS 
regulations are examined. The only difference 
between the two is that there is not a Class 0 for 
IMO regulations. ABS uses DPO to refer to vessels 
without DP systems. IMO does not put this as a 
class of DP vessels. IMO classes start from Class 1.
1. Class 0: DPS-0
 “For vessels, which are fitted with centralized 
manual position control and automatic head-
ing control system to maintain the position and 
heading under the specified maximum environ-
mental conditions” (ABS, 2013). Class 0 does 
not exist on the IMO classification.
2. Class 1: DPS-1
 “For vessels, which are fitted with a dynamic 
positioning system, which is capable of auto-
matically maintaining the position and heading 
of the vessel under specified maximum envi-
ronmental conditions having a manual position 
control system” (ABS, 2013).
3. Class 2: DPS-2
 “For vessels, which are fitted with a dynamic 
positioning system, which is capable of auto-
matically maintaining the position and heading 
of the vessel within a specified operating enve-
lope under specified maximum environmen-
tal conditions during and following any single 
fault, excluding a loss of compartment or com-
partments” (ABS, 2013).
4. Class 3: DPS-3
 “For vessels, which are fitted with a dynamic 
positioning system, which is capable of automati-
cally maintaining the position and heading of the 
vessel within a specified operating envelope under 
specified maximum environmental conditions 
during and following any single fault, including 
complete loss of a compartment due to fire or 
flood” (ABS, 2013).
DPS-1, DPS-2 and DPS-3 classification nota-
tions stated by ABS (2013) are structured to con-
form to IMO (2017). Therefore, the classifications 
DPS-1, DPS-2 and DPS-3 relate to IMO’s equip-
ment classifications 1, 2 and 3 (ABS, 2013).
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3 STATISTIC ANALYSIS
For the purpose of hazard identification, inci-
dent data has been gathered from two sources: the 
World Offshore Accident Database (WOAD) and 
the IMCA. The data from IMCA has been utilised 
for the majority of the analysis as it is consistent 
and covers a substantial time period.
3.1 Terms used by IMCA
The incidents and events listed in the various 
reports have been categorized by IMCA into three 
areas, where PL stands for Position Loss. These 
categories are:
1. DP Incident (PL 1): This is the loss of automatic 
DP control, loss of position or any other incident 
which has resulted in or should have resulted in a 
RED Alert status (IMCA 2017). In other words, 
these are incidents of a serious nature.
2. DP Undesired Event (PL 2): Loss of posi-
tion, loss of  stability, or another event which is 
unexpected or uncontrolled and has resulted in 
or should have resulted in a Yellow Alert status 
(IMCA 2017). As such, they are incidents of a 
less serious nature.
3. DP Downtime: Position keeping problem or 
loss of redundancy which would not warrant 
either a ‘Red’ or ‘Yellow’ alert, but where loss 
of confidence in the DP has resulted in a stand-
down from operational status for investigation, 
rectification, trials, etc. (IMCA 2017). From 
an operational point of  view, a loss of  time or 
downtime can be seen as an undesired event 
which should be avoided at all cost, so as to 
save money.
For the purpose of this research, further analy-
sis focuses on the prior two incidents; DP Incidents 
(PL 1) and Undesired Incidents (PL 2).
There are two common types of position loss, 
these are as follows:
1. Drive Off: This is characterised by the thrusters 
going to high unwanted thrust usually because 
the DP control system believes the position is 
wrong (Jenman 1998).
2. Drift Off: This is caused by the lack of sufficient 
power or thrust. For example, a total blackout 
on a ship on high seas, combined with strong 
currents. This would lead to a drift off (Jenman 
1998).
There was a debate as to how one would differenti-
ate a “drift off” and a “drive off” of vessels that 
were quickly recovered and returned to their origi-
nal position as opposed to vessels which travelled 
far from their original position and could not be 
easily recovered (Jenman 1998). These arguments 
led to the addition of the third type of position 
loss, Large Excursion.
3. Large Excursion: This is an excursion that takes 
the DP vessel beyond its normal excursion char-
acterised by its footprint. The footprint is the 
outline of the vessels movement in a particular 
sea state (Jenman 1998).
3.2 IMCA reporting
Vessels from all over the world, report DP related 
incidents to IMCA, who ensure that the vessel 
reporting is kept anonymous, thereby ensuring 
safety and keeping company integrity. Also, there 
are a range of export regulations and restrictions 
which affect business and trade with many coun-
tries of the world. These include restrictions on 
dual-goods and technology as well as the various 
sanctions regimes (UN, US and EU) targeting 
individual states including, regulation (EU) No. 
833/2014 which is directed at Russia.
The data used in this research is available on 
the IMCA website, to IMCA members only. How-
ever, there are exceptions so that the information 
can be released to other interested parties who 
are not IMCA members. IMCA requires both its 
members and non-members to confirm that they 
will not use any IMCA document in breach of the 
Restrictions.
The data provided spanned over 17 years 
(2000–2016). From the reporting styles over the 
years, some improvements in reporting are visible, 
thereby creating differences in the data provided.
From Table  1, a total of 1,163 incidents were 
analysed and documented by IMCA between the 
17-year periods. From Table 1, it is possible that 
the incident reporting by vessel owners is not con-
sistent. It declined from 2000 to 2004 then picked 
back up, to peak in 2008 and fall again in 2010. 
Then there was a steady increase throughout the 
remaining years.
More emphases should be placed on incident 
reporting, including potential near misses.
Table 1. Incident data analysed from 2000 to 2016.
Incidents reported
2000 110 2008 102
2001  98 2009  75
2002  64 2010  56
2003  51 2011  54
2004  34 2012  64
2005  36 2013  64
2006  59 2014  71
2007  67 2015  80
2008 102 2016  78
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From the 1,163 incidents analysed, 633 of 
those incidents indicated the month in which 
they occurred. This was from the year 2007 to 
2015. Based on these IMCA reports, Table 2 was 
developed.
It can be seen from Table  2 that in the spring 
and summer of the 9 years, recorded the highest 
amount of incidents reported. Taking a closer look 
at the individual years and months, it is evident 
that even though spring has the highest number 
of incidents reported over the 9 years, there were 
more years when summer had more incidents 
reported than spring. From this, one can state that 
the majority of the incidents reported occur during 
summer and spring time.
Looking at the seasons of the year and looking at 
the months where natural disasters are prominent, 
this falls within the same seasons as the one stated 
above. According to AccuWeather Inc., an Ameri-
can media company that provides commercial 
weather forecasting services worldwide, hurricanes 
occurs at different times of the year for different 
regions in the world. For the Atlantic Ocean, hur-
ricane season runs from June to November. In the 
Eastern Pacific Ocean, it occurs in the months of 
May through to November. The hurricane sea-
son for the Western Pacific Ocean runs from July 
to November, while in the South Pacific Ocean, 
it runs from October through to May, reaching a 
peak in late February or early March. The Indian 
Pacific Ocean’s hurricane season runs from April to 
December in the Northern Indian Ocean and Octo-
ber to May in the Southern region (Mummey 2010).
Research conducted by the University of Man-
chester, showed that tornado season in the UK 
occurs within the months of May to October 
(Mulder & Schultz 2015). Mother Nature Network 
on tornado season in America stated that it occurs 
between March and Early June in the Southern 
regions. They also state that in the Gulf Coast, tor-
nadoes occur during the spring, while peaking in 
June and July in the Northern regions. Some states 
are also mentioned to experience a later tornado 
season from October to December (Sarah 2011).
From the analyses above, it is evident that most 
of the adverse weather conditions occur during 
the spring to autumn seasons. It is safe to attribute 
this to the reason why there is a higher frequency 
of incidents reported within the spring to autumn 
seasons.
Furthermore, the IMO does not state at which 
time of the day these incidents have occurred. Sim-
ilarly, it should be noted that these incidents are 
provided from all around the globe, not one spe-
cific region.
For legal, trade and restriction reasons, the 
number of incidents occurring in different areas of 
the world has been withheld.
3.3 Incidents according to vessel type
Several DP vessels with different functions report 
incidents to IMCA. Inconsistency in reporting and 
change of reporting style can be seen in this area. 
The years stated in this report are the years that 
were clearly documented by IMCA. The following 
types of vessels that reported incidents over the 
aforementioned years are as follows:
 1. Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs)
 2. DP Diving Support Vessels (DSV)
 3. Drilling Vessels
 4. Pipe/Cable Lay Vessels
 5. Offshore Loading Vessels
 6. Standby Vessels
 7. Well Operations Vessels
 8. Seismic Vessels
 9. Multi Service Vessels (MSV)
10. Shuttle Tanker
Table 2. Incident data analysed from 2000–2016.
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Season
Dec 10  10  7  3 11  1  2  3  6  53 136 Winter
Jan  5   6  4  1  5  4  6  5  4  40
Feb  6   2  5 10  2  4  2  5  7  43
Mar  5   7  7  4  5 10  8  7 10  63 179 Spring
Apr  6   7 12  4  2  6  3  8 10  58
May  9  14  3  3  5  2  8  8  6  58
Jun  4  11  8  6  5  8 11  5  7  65 172 Summer
Jul  5   7  7  5  4  7  6  5  7  53
Aug  6  11  9  5  3  3  5  8  4  54
Sep  6   9  3  6  4  4  6  5  5  48 145 Autumn
Oct  4   7  2  4  2 10  3  7  5  44
Nov  1  11  7  5  6  5  4  5  9  53
Total 67 102 74 56 54 64 64 71 80 632
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11. Flotels
12. Construction Vessels
13. FPSO
14. Rock Dumping Vessels
15. Crane Vessels
16. Supply Vessels
Since there are different types of vessels of dif-
ferent functions and not all these vessels reported 
incidents every year, Table 3 shows a list of the ves-
sels that reported incidents consistently through 
the stated time period.
Table 3 shows that DSVs have reported the most 
incidents in the 10 years stated above. From 2008 
to 2014, the reporting style changed and the vari-
ous vessels that had experienced incidents were not 
reported.
3.4 Incident main causes
In the IMCA reports, they go further by  indicating 
the primary cause of  each incident, making the 
statistical analysis very easy for the user. Table 4 
shows the incident causes over the past few years
As shown in Table 4, the amount of  incidents 
caused by the various DP elements are visible. 
On further study of  Table  4, the elements that 
cause the most incidents per year can be iden-
tified. These elements have been highlighted in 
bold in Table 4. Judging from this, it is evident 
that the major main causes of  the DP incidents 
that have been reported are caused by either 
Reference element or the Thruster Element. It 
should be noted that the reference element men-
tioned in Table 4 includes the sensors while the 
thruster element mentioned includes the propul-
sion system.
It has been found that in the years prior to 2010, 
reference system failures were the main cause of 
incidents. However, from 2011 to 2016, it can been 
seen that thruster failures have consistently been 
identified as the main cause of DP incidents. In 
2000, there was a drastic drop in incidents related to 
reference systems. The number of reference related 
incidents then peaks again in 2008 falls drastically 
again up to 2016 and the reasons for this has not 
been identified here. It may be assumed that mul-
tiple DP regulations were adopted and enforced 
across the 17-year period which led to the decrease 
in reference related incidents.
Looking at the whole 17-year period, Table  4 
sums up the total incidents caused by the different 
Table 4. Incident main causes from 2000–2016.
Main causes Computer Environment Power gen. Operator Reference Thruster Electrical Other Total
2000  18  5  12  18  34  17  3  3  110
2001  23 18   8   8  14  14 10  3   98
2002  11  3  13   8  14  12  3  0   64
2003   4  7   8  14   6  11  0  1   51
2004   1  2   8   6  12   4  1  0   34
2005   8  3   4   5   5   7  4  0   36
2006   7  4  12  13  11   4  6  2   59
2007  18  4  11   7  13   8  5  1   67
2008  22  3   9   5  27  21 10  5  102
2009   8  2  13  10  18  12 10  2   75
2010   6  4   5   3  21   2 12  3   56
2011  14  5   7   3   9  13  3  0   54
2012   8  2   6  11  11  20  4  2   64
2013   6  3  13   7  15  20  0  0   64
2014  13  2   9   7  12  26  0  2   71
2015  13 11  10  10  11  24  1  0   80
2016  15  0  15  16   7  24  0  1   78
Incidents 195 78 163 151 240 239 72 25 1163
Percentage 16.8% 6.7% 14.0% 13.0% 20.6% 20.6% 6.2% 2.1% 100%
Table 3. Types of vessels reported 2000–2016.
DP  
DSVs Drilling
Pipe/Cable 
Lay
2000  21  22  4
2001  35   5 15
2002  11   5 12
2003  15  10  4
2004   4  13  2
2005   9  15  2
2006  13   9 10
2007  16  15 11
2015  10  20  9
2016  18   2 19
Total 152 116 88
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systems and elements, showing their various per-
centages as they relate to each other.
3.5 Thruster statistics analysis
From the analysis of Table  4, it is evident that 
the thruster system in recent times (2012–2016) 
has been the major cause of incidents. Looking 
further into this, it is possible to define initiating 
causes of undesired events relating to thruster fail-
ures. For this, a more specific analysis of incidents 
caused by thruster failures, that occurred within 
the years of 2012–2016, was conducted. It can be 
seen that for the period in question, a total of 357 
incidents occurred, of which, 114 incidents were 
thruster-caused (31.9%), which is extremely high 
compared to other elements. Of the 114 incidents, 
105 were categorized into the different undesired 
events; “drift off”, “drive off” and “time loss” 
events. Table 5 shows the undesired incidents that 
occurred and their initiating events.
From Table  5, it is clear that the majority of 
thruster related incidents begin with a fault in the 
DP control system, followed by the electrical sys-
tem and the mechanical system. It is worth noting 
here that some minor failures have been grouped 
together to make up the failures mentioned above. 
For control system, there are failures such as, feed-
back error, loss of control, wrong DP operator 
input, etc. These are the failures that are rectified 
when the DP control system is restarted. Software 
errors can also fall under DP control system errors. 
Under electrical errors, there are occurrences such 
as: loose wiring, fibre optic fault, low/high volt-
age supply, loose fuse, field circuit failure and DC 
motor failure. In this case, when the loose wire has 
been fixed or the electrical problem fixed, opera-
tion continues.
In the case of  mechanical initiating failures, 
there are faults such as, low oil pressure, hydrau-
lic pump failure, faulty valve, engine failure, 
oil pipe leakage, cooling motor failure, brake 
 failure, etc. In any of  these mechanical event sce-
narios, a redundant system will have to be used 
or the system will be taken off  DP control and 
returned to port for fixing. For the category of 
human error, there are a number human failures, 
such as: wrong procedures, lack of  maintenance, 
inexperience and late response. Some human 
errors fall under the DP control system, because 
there has to be an interface between the control 
system and the human. Here, depending on the 
fault, the vessel is regained as soon as possible 
to avoid a worse undesired event. For the refer-
ence system, there are errors such as; wind sen-
sor errors, tachometer errors, DGPS errors, etc. 
These errors coupled with some hidden errors 
can cause the thruster to fail at an odd angle 
(pitch). Finally, there are failures relating to the 
power generators. These failures are explana-
tory on their own and can cause more than the 
thrusters to fail. They also include the failure of 
the Uninterrupted Power Supply system (UPS). 
When these fail, they can cause an immediate 
failure of  the thruster, which can be fixed by a 
redundant power generation system.
4 CONCLUSION
From the statistical analysis presented in this 
study, it was possible to determine the number 
of incidents that occurred in the different sea-
sons of the year, over a 9-year period. From the 
results obtained, it was observed that there was an 
increase in the incidents in the spring and summer 
seasons. From research it was discovered that this 
could be as a result of the harsh natural weather 
conditions that occur during those seasons of the 
year, such as, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc. The tides 
that occur during the spring, resulting in high tide 
were also mentioned as a factor for increased inci-
dents during these seasons.
The vessel types with the most incidents were 
also analysed. It was found that of  all the ves-
sels recorded, the three types; DSV, Pipelay and 
Drilling Vessels had the most incidents recorded. 
The DSV had the most recorded incidents, with 
152 consistently recorded (see Table 3). The rea-
son for this was not fully identified, however it 
can be argued that pipelay vessels are not used as 
frequently the DSVs or Drilling vessels. Hence, 
this has resulted in large difference in the number 
of  reported incidents relating to these vessel 
types.
Following this, the main causes were analysed 
and separated into several categories. It was found 
that the two categories with the highest number of 
incidents in the 17 year period (2000–2016) were 
the reference and thruster systems. On further 
investigation of the data, it was found that within 
Table  5. Undesired incidents identified from thruster 
failures and their initiating causes from 2012 to 2016.
Undesired  
events
Drive  
off
Drift  
off
Time  
loss Total
Reference  0  0  2   2
Electrical  5  3 21  29
Mechanical  2  2 21  25
Generator  0  0  1   1
Control system  7  6 22  35
Human error  3  2  7  12
Total 17 13 74 104
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the years 2000 to 2002 there was a drastic drop in 
reference caused incidents. Although not found, 
it is suspected that a regulation was brought into 
force during that time that either checked incident 
occurrence or made the operators not to be able to 
report incidents.
Failure of  thruster systems were further ana-
lysed because in previous years (2012–2016), they 
were the major cause of  DP incidents. The analy-
sis led to the discovery of  the initiating events of 
the thruster failures and their final consequences 
(Drift-Off, Drive-Off  and Time Loss). This 
helped to identify the hazards and establish the 
basic events that would cause the release of  such 
hazards and provided a base to conduct a risk 
assessment.
Although there were changes in the style of 
reporting, which led to the inconsistency of some 
information, the data sourced from IMCA was 
sufficient in identifying the hazards relating to DP 
operations.
Finally, from the hazard analysis, reference fail-
ures and thruster failures were identified as the 
major causes of DP incidents, with control failure 
being the most frequent initiating event leading to 
thruster failures.
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